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Fighting Corruption at the Local Level: The
Federal Government's Reach Has Been
Broadened
Salinas v. United States'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)2 has
produced a complex body of law. One area within the Act, conspiracy to violate
the substantive provisions of RICO under Section 1962(d), has produced
contrary views in the federal courts of appeals as to whether one must agree to
personally commit the illegal, predicate acts, or whether one need only agree that
another member of the conspiracy commit the acts. The United States Supreme
Court has now settled the debate over this issue by holding that one need only
agree that some member of the enterprise will commit the predicate acts.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Petitioner Salinas was the deputy at a county jail in Hidalgo County, Texas
that was receiving federal funds for housing federal prisoners. Brigido
Marmolego was the sheriff of that county and was involved in a scheme whereby
he accepted funds from a prisoner, Homero Beltran-Aguirre ("Beltran"), in
exchange for allowing Beltran to have "contact visits"4 with his wife, and at
other times his girlfriend.' Sheriff Marmolego was paid six thousand dollars per
month plus one thousand dollars per visit.6 Petitioner Salinas, who managed the
jail and supervised the prisoners, received a pair of watches and a pickup truck
from Beltran for his assistance.7
Salinas was charged with two counts of bribery under 18 U.S.C. §
666(a)(91)(B), one count of violating Section 1962(c) of RICO, and one count
of conspiracy to violate RICO under Section 1962(d). Ajury acquitted Salinas
of the substantive (Section 1962(c)) RICO count, but convicted him of the
1. 118 S. Ct. 469 (1997).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994).
3. Salinas, 118 S. Ct. at 472.
4. Contact visits, more commonly known as conjugal visits, allow a prisoner to
meet privately and have sexual relations with his/her visitor.
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bribery and conspiracy to violate RICO counts The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision.9
The United States Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that under the
bribery statute it is not necessary that the bribe in any way affect federal funds."0
The Court further held that in order to be convicted of conspiracy to violate
RICO, one did not have to agree to personally commit the predicate acts required
under Section 1962(c)."
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Conspiracy to Violate RICO
18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to
conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this
section."' 2 Section 1962(c) makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or
associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly,
in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt."' 3 RICO defines "through a pattern of
racketeering activity" as "at least two acts of racketeering activity" within a ten-
year time frame. 4 The "racketeering activity" is commonly referred to as
"predicate acts." Actions that constitute "predicate acts" are set forth in a
lengthy, detailed list which includes several federal and state criminal statutes. 5
The issue in Salinas was whether the petitioner must have personally
committed or agreed to commit two or more predicate acts to be found guilty of
conspiracy, or whether it was sufficient just to agree to be a member of the
enterprise and that some member of the enterprise would commit the predicate
acts.' 6 The federal courts of appeals have been divided on this issue.' 7
8. Id. at 473.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 473-74.
11. Id. at 478.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1994).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1994).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1994).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1994).
16. Salinas v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 469,476 (1997).
17. Id. The First, Second, and Tenth Circuits adopted the position Salinas argued,
whereas the other circuits have adopted the government's position. Compare United
States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1136 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011
(1983); United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
United States v. Rabito, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); and United States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d
1466, 1473 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 846 (1991), with United States v. Pryba,
900 F.2d 748, 760 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 924 (1990); United States v.
[Vol. 64
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The First Circuit, in United States v. Winter, held that the United States
Government must prove that the defendant agreed to personally commit two or
more predicate acts.' 8 The court was persuaded by United States v. Elliott,9
which held that "[t]o be convicted as a member of an enterprise conspiracy, an
individual by his words or actions, must have objectively manifested an
agreement to participate, directly or indirectly, in the affairs of an enterprise
through the commission of two or more predicate crimes."2 The defendant
argued that he must have actually committed two predicate acts to be guilty of
conspiracy. The very nature of conspiracy persuaded the court to accept the
Government's argument because "coconspirators need not have accomplished
their underlying criminal goals to be found guilty of conspiracy."21 Interestingly,
in United States v. Winter, the Government took the position that the defendant
must only agree to personally commit two predicate acts, whereas the defendant
argued that he must actually commit two predicate acts. At that time, the United
States Department of Justice manual for federal prosecutors also said that "every
defendant in a proposed RICO conspiracy count must be shown to have agreed
personally to commit two or more racketeering acts."22 In later cases, defendants
disputed the holding from Winter as the Government began to take an even
broader approach to reading the statute. The parties in Winter did not raise the
issue, nor did the court address, whether it could also be sufficient to merely
agree that some member of the enterprise would commit the predicate acts.23
This issue has dominated RICO conspiracy cases since Winter. In a later First
Circuit case, United States v. Aguilo,24 the court also focused on the lack of an
overt act requirement in the RICO conspiracy statute.25
Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 860 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489,
494-500 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940 (1986); United States v. Joseph, 781 F.2d
549, 554 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1115-16 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985); United States v. Tille, 729 F.2d 615, 619 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984); and United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514, 1529-31 (1 lth
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. United States v. Morris, 469 U.S. 819 (1984).
18. Winter, 663 F.2d at 1136.
19. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978).
20. Winter, 663 F.2d at 1136 (quoting Elliott 571 F.2d at 903).
21. Id.
22. United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 494-95 (7th Cir.) (quoting U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL Div., RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGS.
(RICO): A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 72 (1985)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940
(1986).
23. United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1136 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1011 (1983).
24. 847 F.2d 956 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928 (1988).
25. Id. at 964.
1999] RICO
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In United States v. Ruggiero,26 the Second Circuit followed the Winter
decision. However, the arguments made were a little different. The Government
argued it was sufficient to prove that the defendant "was found to have conspired
with others to engage through an enterprise in a pattern of racketeering
consisting of predicate acts committed by others," whereas the defendant argued
that he must have agreed to personally commit the acts.27 Calling the
Government's position an "extremely broad" interpretation of RICO, the court
adopted the holding of Winter and reversed one defendant's conviction because
he was convicted of only one conspiracy that could have been a predicate act.28
The Tenth Circuit found Ruggeiro persuasive and adopted the rule that "the
defendant must agree to personally commit two predicate acts, not merely agree
to the commission of two predicate offenses by any conspirator."'29
The other circuits,3" however, have taken the view that the defendant must
only agree that the enterprise operate through a pattern of racketeering activity.
These courts base their reasoning on three general arguments: the text of the
statute, that a broad reading of RICO conspiracy follows general hornbook
conspiracy law, and the purpose of RICO in combating organized crime.3"
In United States v. Neapolitan,32 the Seventh Circuit, adopting the reasoning
of the Eleventh Circuit, reasoned that when Sections 1962(d) and 1962(c) are
read together, the statute "speak[s] only to conspiring to conduct or participate,
26. 726 F.2d 913 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 839 (1984).
27. Id. at 921. See also United States v. Persico, 832 F.2d 705, 713 (2d Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
28. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d at 921. Defendant Tomasulo had been convicted of
conspiracy to distribute heroin and conspiracy to run a gambling operation, and the court
held the latter could not be a RICO predicate act. Id. at 918-20.
29. United States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466, 1473 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 846 (1990).
30. The circuits include the Fifth, Fourth, Eighth, Seventh, Sixth, Third, Ninth, and
Eleventh. See United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1196 (5th Cir. 1996), cert
granted sub nom. Salinas v. United States, 519 U.S. 1198, aftd, 522 U.S. 52 (1997);
United States v. Pryba, 900 F.2d 748, 760 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 924 (1990);
United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 860 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v.
'Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 494-500 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940 (1986); United
States v. Joseph, 781 F.2d 549, 554 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d
1099, 1115-16 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985); United States v. Tille, 729
F.2d 615, 619 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984); United States v. Carter, 721
F.2d 1514, 1529-31 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. United States v. Morris, 469 U.S.
819 (1984).
31. See, e.g., Pryba, 900 F.2d at 760; Kragness, 830 F.2d at 860. Furthermore, the
courts have been persuaded by the language of the statute itself, because it only requires
that one "participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity," id. at 854 (emphasis added), and does not
speak only of conducting the affairs of the enterprise in such a manner.
32. 791 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940 (1986).
[Vol. 64
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directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity.' 33 The court also stated that "[t]he natural reading of this
language is that 'through a pattern of racketeering activity' modifies the
preceding language 'the conduct of such enterprise's affairs,' rather than...
'conspiring to conduct or participate."'34 Furthermore, RICO contains no
explicit requirement that one agree to personally commit the predicate acts; it
only requires that one "participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.3s The Act does
not speak only of conducting the affairs of the enterprise in such a manner.36
The Neapolitan court was also persuaded by the two general rules of RICO
construction: first, that the United States Supreme Court reads the statute
broadly and literally, and second, that RICO is a remedial, not a substantive,
statute.37 The second general rule suggests that because RICO conspiracy is only
an increased sanction for activity which is made criminal elsewhere in the United
States Code, the courts should not require more than is needed for conspiracy to
commit other crimes. 3
The second rationale that the appellate courts look to is that this
interpretation of RICO conspiracy law follows general conspiracy law. "Under
classic conspiracy law agreeing to the commission of the conspiracy's
illegitimate objectives constitutes the crime., 39 As the Fourth Circuit stated,
"[t]he heart of conspiracy is the agreement to do something that the law forbids.
There is no requirement that each conspirator personally commit illegal acts in
furtherance of the conspiracy or to accomplish its objectives." 40 To be convicted
under the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, "a defendant need only
agree to participate in the conspiracy with knowledge of the essential objectives
of the conspiracy.'
33. Id. (quoting Carter, 721 F.2d at 1529).
34. Id. at 495-96 (quoting Carter, 721 F.2d at 1529 n.22).
35. United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 860 (8th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).
The Eighth Circuit followed Kragness in United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1367
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932 (1988).
36. Kragness, 830 F.2d at 860.
37. United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 940 (1986) (citing Haroco v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398
(7th Cir.)), cert. granted, 469 U.S. 1157, aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985)). RICO is "not
ambiguous but which is, above all, deliberately and extraordinarily broad." Haroco, 747
F.2d at 398.
38. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 497. See also United States v. Glecier, 923 F.2d 496
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 810 (1991); United States v. Stem, 858 F.2d 1241 (7th
Cir. 1988); United States v. O'Malley, 796 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1986).
39. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 496.
40. United States v. Pryba, 900 F.2d 748, 760 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 924
(1990). See generally United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 860 (8th Cir. 1987).
41. United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514, 1529 n.21 (lth Cir.), cert. denied sub
1999] RICO
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The third and final rationale given by the courts is that the general purpose
of RICO would be frustrated by a narrow reading of the conspiracy statute. "[l]n
enacting RICO, Congress found that 'organized crime continues to grow' in part
'because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are
unnecessarily limited in scope and import."', 42 The Neapolitan court was
persuaded by the findings of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, which
stated that the purpose of the statute is "to seek the eradication of organized
crime in the United States... by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by
providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crimes., 43  The court therefore
concluded that "it seems more likely that Congress, in search of means to
prosecute the leaders of organized crime, intended § 1962(d) to be broad enough
to encompass those persons who, while intimately involved in the conspiracy,
neither agreed to personally commit nor actually participated in the commission
of the predicate crimes."'  The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Kragness,
also realized that a narrow reading of the RICO conspiracy statute would not
achieve the purpose of the statute.45
The circuits which hold that one need not agree to personally commit any
acts basically agree about what it is one must agree to in order to be part of a
conspiracy. The Kragness court said the defendant must have knowledge of the
scheme or predicate acts.46 The Fifth Circuit stated that the agreement need only
establish that "each defendant must necessarily have known others were also
conspiring to participate in the same enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity."'47 The Neapolitan court provided a little more guidance, stating that
"the defendant must manifest his agreement to the objective of a violation of
RICO" through "an agreement to conduct or participate in the affairs of an
enterprise, and an agreement to the commission of at least two predicate acts."'48
nom. Morris v. United States, 489 U.S. 819 (1984).
42. Id. at 1529 (quoting United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 902 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Hawkins v. United States, 439 U.S. 953 (1978)).
43. United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 940 (1986) (quoting Statement of Findings and Purpose of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970)). See also United
States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 237-38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1981).
44. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 498.
45. United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 860 (8th Cir. 1987).
46. Id.
47. United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1183, 1193 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 949 (1982). See also United States v. Manzella, 782 F.2d 533, 538-39 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Jimenez v. United States, 476 U.S. 1123 (1986); United States v.
Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 383 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982).
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A "mere association" with the enterprise is not sufficient for a conviction.'
Furthermore, as with general conspiracy law, the existence of an agreement need
not be express; it may be "inferred from the circumstances. 50
B. Bribery Count
Section 666 makes it a crime if an agent of a state, local, or Indian tribal
government or agency that receives federal funds in excess of $10,000 "corruptly
solicits or demands for the benefit of any person, or accepts or agrees to accept,
anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in
connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such
organization, government, or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or
more. ... "" The issue in Salinas was whether the bribe must have affected the
use of the federal funds received by the agency or governmental entity.
The majority of circuits that have addressed this issue have held that RICO
does not require that the federal funds be affected by the bribery or theft. In
United States v. Coyne,52 the defendant, a county executive, accepted bribes in
exchange for ensuring that the county purchased cars from a long-time friend,
and for providing funding for a dive rescue team to which this friend belonged.53
The county received $24,604,072 in federal aid, none of which was intended for
purchasing the cars or equipment.5 4 The court, focusing on the statutory
language and legislative intent, held that
[t]he statutory language of Section 666 requires proof only that
the accused be an agent of a local government that received in
excess of $10,000 of federal funds in the one year period. The
language neither explicitly nor implicitly requires that the
$10,000 be directly linked to the program that was the subject of
the bribe. s5
The defendant attempted to rely on the Senate Report accompanying
Section 666, which stated that the Act was derived from Senate Bill 1630.56 The
committee report accompanying Senate Bill 1630 stated that a theft must be
"from a [federally funded] program," that a bribe must be "related to the
administration of [a federally funded] program," and that the "conduct sought to
49. Id. at 499.
50. Id. at 501 (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942)).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) (1994).
52. 4 F.3d 100 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1095 (1994).
53. Id. at 107-08.
54. Id. at 108.
55. Id. at 109.
56. Id. at 109-10.
1999] RICO
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be influenced by the bribe must be 'related to the administration of the [federally
funded] program."'' 7 The court easily rejected the defendant's arguments,
however, because that language was not included in Section 666 when it was
passed in 1982.
In United States v. Westmoreland,58 the Fifth Circuit came to the same
conclusion. The defendant, Supervisor of Perry County, Mississippi, received
"kickbacks" in the purchasing of county materials.5 9 She argued, inter alia, that
the federal statute did not apply in cases that only involved state funds.6 ' That
year, Perry County had received $222,949 in federal revenue sharing funds,
$36,391.55 of which was allocated to Westmoreland's district.6' She argued that
Section 666(a)(1)(B) required the involvement of over $5,000 offederal funds.62
Finding the statutory language "plain and unambiguous," the court found no
support for the proposition that "any transaction involving $5,000 means 'any
federally funded transaction involving $5,000' or 'any transaction involving
$5,000 of federal funds'. .. 63 The court pointed out that the statute clearly
read that
when a local government agent receives an annual benefit of more
than $10,000 under a federal assistance program, its agents are
governed by the statute, and an agent violates subsection (b) when he
engages in the prohibited conduct "in any transaction or matter or
series of transactions or matters involving $5,000 or more conceming
the affairs of' the local government agency. 4
Furthermore, the court was persuaded because one of the purposes behind not
including such a requirement was the difficulty of tracing federal funds. 65
Another reason not to require a direct affect on federal funds is the need to
"preserve the integrity of federal funds by assuring the integrity of the
organizations or agencies that receive them. 66 Finally, the court noted that "it
is clear that Congress has cast a broad net to encompass local officials who may
administer federal funds, regardless of whether they actually do., 67 Following
Westmoreland, the Fifth Circuit summarily rejected the argument that the
government had to prove that the cost of corruption would be paid with federal
57. Id. at 110 n.1 (quoting S. REP. No. 97-307, at 726 (1981)).
58. 841 F.2d 572 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 820 (1988).
59. Id. at 573.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 575.
62. Id. at 575-76.
63. Id. at 576.
64. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (1994)).
65. Id. at 576-77.
66. Id. at 578.
67. Id. at 577.
[Vol. 64
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/10
funds. 68 In United States v. Smith, the court also stated that "[t]he language in
Section 666 is clear that it is not an essential element of this crime that the
government trace the $5,000 to specific federal government fumds. 69
At least one court, however, reached a different conclusion, driven by
concerns of federal-state relations. In United States v. Frega,° the court
concluded that the legislative history of Section 666 demonstrated that Congress
intended a broad reach for the statute, but only as to the protection of federal
funds.7' To allow federal interference otherwise "would drastically change the
balance of power between federal and state governments by bringing conduct
that had previously been entirely in the realm of the states within the federal
purview.' 72 The court was also persuaded against allowing the application of
Section 666 to bribery of state court judges because California had a criminal
statute that adequately addressed the conduct.73
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Foley,74 also stated that the
connection between the bribery and the federal funds must be at least indirectly
connected to the integrity of the federal funds in order for the conduct to fall
within the reach of the statute.75 The Foley court determined that the legislative
history established that Section 666 was "not designed for the prosecution of
corruption that was not shown in some way to touch upon federal funds.,
7 6
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Conspiracy to Violate RICO
The Court, following the general rule that "[w]hen congress uses well-
settled terminology of criminal law, its words are presumed to have their
ordinary meaning and definition," looked to the general nature of conspiracy law
to arrive at its holding that a defendant need not have agreed to personally
commit the predicate acts.77 Generally, a conspiracy exists, even if one does not
agree to commit all of the acts himself.7 It is a well-settled principle that "so
long as they share a common purpose, conspirators are liable for the acts of their
68. United States v. Little, 889 F.2d 1367, 1369 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S.
933 (1990).
69. 659 F. Supp. 833, 835 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
70. 933 F. Supp. 1536 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
71. Id. at 1543.
72. Id. at 1540.
73. Id.
74. 73 F.3d 484 (2d Cir. 1996).
75. Id. at 490.
76. Id. at 493. Under the Foley standard, Westmoreland's conviction would have
been reversed.
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co-conspirators."79 This is true "even if a conspirator does not agree to commit
or facilitate each and every part of the substantive offense," or even when the
defendant was completely "incapable of committing the substantive offense."8
The Court further pointed out that the RICO conspiracy statute is broader than
general federal conspiracy in that it does not have the requirement of an overt
act."
In trying to explain the decisions of the circuit courts that have followed the
contrary view, the Court pointed out that they may have been persuaded by the
fact that "[i]n some cases the connection the defendant had to the alleged
enterprise or to the conspiracy to further it may be tenuous enough so that his
own commission of two predicate acts may become an important part of the
Government's case.,82 The Court concluded that "even if Salinas did not accept
or agree to accept two bribes," there was evidence of a conspiracy in that Salinas
knew about Sheriff Marmolejo's acceptance of bribes, which constituted the
predicate acts, and agreed to facilitate the scheme.8 3
B. Bribery Count
The Supreme Court focused on the clear language of the statute, holding
that "[t]he prohibition is not confined to a business or transaction which affects
federal funds."" The petitioner argued that it was also necessary to consider the
legislative history of Section 666.85 The Court, however, pointed out that "'only
the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions' in the legislative history
will justify a departure from that language."86 The Court looked to 18 U.S.C. §
201 to support its view of the legislative history. Section 201 was the general
bribery provision in existence before Section 666, and applied only to "public
officials" which were defined as "officer[s] or employee[s] or person[s] acting
for or on behalf of the United States, or any department, agency, or branch of
Government thereof... in any official function, under or by authority of any
such department, agency, or branch." 87 The courts applying Section 201 were
split over whether a state or local employee could be considered a public official,
which, according to the Court, prompted Congress to pass Section 666 to expand
coverage to bribes taken by state and local officials. 88 The Court further
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 253-54
(1940); United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915)).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 478.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 473.
85. Id. at 474.
86. Id. at 474 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985)).
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reasoned that Congress was reacting to the Second Circuit's narrow construction
of Section 201 in United States v. Del Toro,89 which held that a city employee
was not a public official even though federal funds were heavily involved in the
program he managed because the city had not yet formally requested the
funding. 0
Salinas further argued that in order for Section 666 to apply to bribes not
affecting federal funds, congressional intent to that effect must be clearly
stated.9' However, the Court dismissed this argument by pointing out that "[a]
statute can be unambiguous without addressing every interpretive theory offered
by a party."'92 The Supreme Court then unanimously affirmed the conviction.93
V. COMMENT
Neither holding of the Court was a surprise, and both are well grounded in
statutory interpretation and legislative intent. The Court followed the majority
of the circuit courts in its RICO holding-and remained consistent with all of the
circuits that addressed the impact on federal funds issue in regards to Section
666. The real questions may be whether this is really the type of situation
targeted by the RICO conspiracy statute, and whether the bribery statute is
constitutional.
This holding is in tune with the federal conspiracy statute, Section 371, and
common law conspiracy. At common law, the elements of conspiracy are: "(1)
an agreement between two or more persons, which constitutes the act; and (2)
an intent thereby to achieve a certain objective which... is the doing of either
an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means. 94 As the federal courts of
appeals, and now the Supreme Court, have stated, the agreement to join an
enterprise that has the objective of operating through a pattern of racketeering
activity is the conspiracy. "The 'essence' of a conspiracy is 'an agreement to
commit an unlawful act."' 95 Furthermore, the Court does not overextend the
reach of conspiracy because it still requires that the defendant must have agreed
that someone in the enterprise would commit the acts, and not merely that the
accused just have agreed to be a member of the enterprise. RICO conspiracy has
89. 513 F.2d 656 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975).
90. Salinas v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 469,474 (1997).
91. Id. at 474.
92. Id. at 475.
93. Id. at478.
94. James Clann Minnis, Clarifying RICO's Conspiracy Provision: Personal
Commitment Not Required, 62 TUL. L. REv. 1399, 1401 (1988) (quoting W. LAFAVE &
A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4, at 525 (2d ed. 1986)).
95. Karen Anderson & Megan Bertron, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 33 AM.
CRiM. L. REv. 729, 732 (1996) (citing lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777
(1975); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946)).
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not been reduced to guilt by association. This is also similar to general
conspiracy law.
96
The purpose of RICO was to attack and break down organized crime. It
was especially necessary because of the difficulty in prosecuting the heads of
families for crimes because they had other people actually commit the crimes.
The crime leaders are experienced, resourceful, and shrewd in evading
and dissipating the effects of established procedures in law
enforcement. Their operating methods, carefully and cleverly evolved
during several decades of this century, generally are highly effective
foils against diligent police efforts to obtain firm evidence that would
lead to prosecution and conviction. The crime chieftains, for example,
have developed the process of "insulation" to a remarkable degree.
The efficient police forces in a particular area may well be aware that
a crime leader has ordered a murder, or is an important trafficker in
narcotics, or controls an illegal gambling network, or extorts usurious
gains from "shylocking" ventures. Convicting him of crimes,
however, is usually extremely difficult and sometimes impossible,
simply because the top-ranking criminal has taken the utmost care to
insulate himself from any apparent physical connection with the crime
or with his having to commit it."
It would not make sense for the Supreme Court to adopt any other holding
because to do so would further insulate leaders of organized crime from
conspiracy charges, except in the rare instances when they personally commit
crimes.
The situation in Salinas did not involve organized crime. Nevertheless, it
has become commonplace to extend RICO to situations other than organized
crime, including political corruption," white collar crime,99 and violent
groups."° Something that is always a concern is the necessity of punishing such
96.Id.
97. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T
OPERATIONS, ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS, S. REP. No. 89-72,
at 2 (1965). See also R. SALERNO & J. TOMPKINS, THE CRIME CONFEDERATION: COSA
NOSTRA AND ALLIED OPERATIONS IN ORGANIZED CRIME 156 (1969).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Bustamonte, 45 F.3d 933, 935 (5th Cir. 1995);
United States v. McDade, 28 F.3d 283, 289 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1003 (1995);
United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004
(1989).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Marubeni Amer. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 766 (9th Cir.
1980).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1365 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
514 U.S. 1113 (1995); United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 815-16 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 993 (1994); United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1526-28, 1540, 1546
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conduct under a federal statute when a state statute under which the defendant
could instead be punished already exists. RICO has become "the prosecutor's
tool of choice against sophisticated forms of crime."' 0 ' But how sophisticated
is the crime of taking bribes for conjugal visits between inmates and spouses/
girlfriends? More importantly, is going along with the Sheriff's conduct really
enough to say that Salinas joined an enterprise with conscious awareness that he
was manifesting an agreement to operate their enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity? Did Salinas agree that the Sheriff would accept the money
in exchange for the conjugal visits, which constituted the predicate acts, or did
he just go along with it so he could profit a little by the conduct? Chances are
that Salinas did not realize he was becoming part of an enterprise, nor that he
was agreeing on how the operation would run. He was simply taking bribes.
Furthermore, no matter how reprehensible his conduct, it does not necessarily
mean that he should have been prosecuted under RICO instead of a state bribery
or corruption statute. Other than the money given to the prison each year to
house prisoners, what federal connection justifies a federal prosecution for
conduct that primarily impacted the operations at a county jail?
The reach of Section 666 is unquestionably broad after Salinas, especially
when one considers that thousands of local governmental entities and all states
receive federal assistance, and that ten thousand dollars is not a high
minimum.2 The Court provided a clear interpretation of the statute that is easy
to apply. The broad use of Section 666 to prosecute bribery not directly
affecting federal funds has raised questions concerning its constitutionality.0 3
The use of the statute as a general anticonspiracy statute has been questioned
because of intrusion into an area of law traditionally left to state legislatures."
Some courts have attempted to take a narrower reading of the statute.0 5 Their
opinion, however, is the minority and is not even addressed by the Salinas
decision.
Although the Court properly read the literal text of the statute, its avoidance
of the federal-state issue could draw sharp criticism. The Salinas court stated
only that the existing lfalance of federal-state power had to remain, absent a clear
intention by Congress to change it."° However, the Court did not explain why
the balance that existed prior to the passage of Section 666 was important, nor
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866 (1988).
101. G. Robert Blakely & John Robert Blakely, Civil and Criminal RICO: An
Overview of the Statute and its Operation, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 36, 42 (1997).
102. See George D. Brown, Stealth Statute-Corruption, the Spending Power, and
the Rise of 18 US.C. § 666, 73 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 247,247 (1998).
103. Id. at 247.
104. Id. at 289-306.
105. See United States v. Foley, 73 F.3d 484,490-93 (2d Cir. 1996); United States
v. Frega, 933 F. Supp. 1536, 1540 (S.D. Cal. 1996); see also United States v. Marmolejo,
89 F.3d 1185, 1203-04 (5th Cir. 1996) (Jolly, J., dissenting).
106. Salinas v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 465, 474-75 (1997).
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even what the balance was. To simply say that the statute is unambiguous may
not be satisfactory. Additionally, the protection of the integrity of federal funds
may not be a strong enough reason for applying the law to this type of situation.
The defendant was a county deputy working in a county jail. The only federal
connection in the case was the use of federal money to pay for housing the
prisoners, yet it was not necessary for the Government to prove any effect on the
federal program. The Government did not even have to prove the slight
connection suggested by Foley, that the bribery was at least indirectly connected
to the integrity of the federal funds. 7 An indirect connection standard would
probably put an end to the criticism of Section 666 and questions concerning its
constitutionality because a federal interest would then be implicated, even if only
indirectly.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court took a very literal reading of both the RICO conspiracy
statute and the bribery statute. While the broad reading of RICO conspiracy is
necessary to achieve the intended purpose of the statute, attacking organized
crime, the application of the Court's holding to situations not involving
organized crime may go too far. In those situations, the courts must carefully
weigh the evidence presented by the Government that is offered to show that the
defendant agreed to the operation of the enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity.
The broad reading of the bribery statute is likely to draw criticism because
of the weak link between the crime and the federal funds in many cases.
Because essentially no link is required between the crime and the federal funds,
the purpose of using the statute to combat local conspiracy raises eyebrows as
to the constitutionality of such an application. We are left to rely on
prosecutorial discretion to preserve the federal-state balance in fighting local
corruption. Whether this is solid footing remains to be seen.
KAY BARTELSON PERRY
107. Foley, 73 F.3d at 490.
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